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But the military surrender was a different blow—devastating and beyond imagination. The manner in which it took place, without a full fight given to the enemy, and the senior military commanders laying down their arms with no sign of remorse, compounded the disgrace. The humiliation and the anger felt by the masses, and more so by the fighting men, who were cheated by their top commanders, lingers in their minds.
The political chaos in 1971 and the India-Pakistan War culminating in secession of Pakistan’s Eastern Wing was the product of a deeply planned plot executed by a joint axis of United States, Israel, Britain, India and former Soviet Union. Its mastermind was the Zionist International Jewry (Zinjry) that controls the power centers in these countries through its entrenched lobbies. The plot could not have succeeded without the active participation of a treacherous gang of civil and military leaders within Pakistan.
Books and articles have been published in Bangladesh on how the East Pakistanis were made the victims of a vast scheme to give up a part of their own country. Same lament was expressed earlier in books such as Subversion in East Pakistan, by AMK Maswani, Second Thoughts on Bangladesh, narrated by a repentant rebel, and Bangladesh Today—Indictment and a Lament, by the distinguished East Pakistani intellectual Matiur Rahman.
East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, may still one day rejoin with the parent country. People in both the Wings are ready to forgive and forget. No one doubts that they were made the victims of an international conspiracy that included the services of several local agents. The Muslim people of Bangladesh are now conscious that they were deceived by their own ‘native’ leaders, into giving up the larger part of their own country, thus depriving themselves of the land and all its resources. They have also realized that they were misled by design into looking upon Indians as their friends and West Pakistanis as enemies. They have learnt the truth was exactly the opposite; Hindu India was their real enemy, and it will remain so.
But the military surrender was a different blow. It was devastating. It was totally unexpected, and beyond imagination. The manner in which it took place—without a full fight given to the enemy, and the senior army and navy commanders laying down their arms with no sign of remorse—compounded the disgrace. The pain of humiliation and the anger felt by the masses, and much more so by the fighting men, who had been cheated by their top commanders, lingers in their minds.
There is plenty of literature on the 1971 Crisis and the India-Pakistan War, but several devious and decisive schemes and maneuvers that nurtured the crisis and shaped its outcome are still to be exposed. Amongst these is the story of the shameful surrender inflicted on Pakistan. What forced the sudden and humiliating surrender on 16 December1971, in just three and a half weeks of fighting, after India’s full-scale launching of the war by attackingsimultaneously as many as 23 salients along the border in East Pakistan on the night 20/21 November?
The writings of Americans on the 1971 episode are a rich (though for us Pakistanis sorrowful) source of revelations about many of the otherwise less known occurrences. Henry Kissinger’s voluminous work, The White House Years, is one example. When the relevant written material is placed beside the events that took place before, during and after the war, the analysis exposes the US hand in fomenting rebellion by the Awami League against the State, assisting India in raising, arming and deploying the Mukti Bahni terrorists in East Pakistan, then provoking the war and devising a quick defeat for Pakistan.
The most revealing, and depressing, tale is to find how the top leaders in East and West Pakistan were duped into yielding to the idea of military surrender. The Indians had not expected even in their wildest estimates that the Pakistan forces in the Eastern Wing would surrender in just three weeks of fighting. Even reaching Dacca was not in their war plan.  Indian army officer, Major General Sukhwant Singh, who was on active duty in 1971 and later authored a book on the war, after pointing out the "formidable obstacles" that prevented an advance to Dacca, writes; "Because of these limitations the higher command, in assigning tasks to Eastern Command, did not spell out the capture of Dacca but left it to be considered during the conduct of operations as and when opportunity offered itself.”1 
Indeed, in spite of the serious handicaps (which anyway are a part of warfare) the Pakistan forces in the Eastern Wing could have fought on for several more weeks. Pointing out the quantum of troops, weapons and supplies at the time of ceasefire in the Northwestern Sector in East Pakistan, Sukhwant Singh observes: "It showed that most of the Pakistani units were up to operational strength and had a considerable potential to continue the war, if General Niazi had not accepted such an early ceasefire.”2
Military surrender is actually alien to the psychological make-up as well as the combat spirit and discipline of the Pakistani soldier. What caused the surrender?
It was obvious from the known circumstances surrounding the surrender that the Indians had no part in bringing it about. They joined in the scheme only at the later stages; and the reward, of course, was reaped by them. The surrender was brought about by the US with masterful machinations, involving disinformation, secret diplomacy, bands of spies and local agents in Pakistan and India and manipulation of the pliant persons who had been selectively placed in key positions in Islamabad and Dacca. The master stroke was the highly deceptive dispatch of the US naval forces to the Bay of Bengal.
The dramatic deployment of the US warships performed the pivotal role in the grand maneuver of deception and psychological warfare targeting the Pakistani leaders. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations of the US Navy in 197I is the best narrator of this drama, though he was not privy to the secret treacherous aim behind it, which only Kissinger and the other Zionist schemers knew. In On Watch: A Memoir, Zumwalt writes:
"On 10 December, a Presidential order, that was not discussed with the Navy in advance, created Task Group (TG) 74, consisting of the nuclear carrier Enterprise and appropriate escorts, and sent it steaming from the Gulf of Tonkin to Singapore. The order did not specify what TG 74’s mission was, nor could anyone, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, tell me.
The ships were held off Singapore for two days. On 12 December they were ordered through the Straits of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. Within an hour that order was rescinded! Next day it was reissued, with the additional proviso that as much of the passage through the Straits as possible be in daylight, in other words, in full view of the world. At the same time ‘sources’ in Washington let it be known that the object of the exercise was covering the evacuation of American civilians from Dacca.
This clearly was a cover story since that evacuation, after having been impeded by the fighting for a week, was successfully completed two days before TG 74 entered the Indian Ocean. (After entering the Indian Ocean) the Task Group was sent south of Ceylon (where it kept cruising leisurely). Then, on 8 January, TG 74 was ordered out of the Indian Ocean as mysteriously as it had been ordered in."3
Admiral Zumwalt complains: "I still do not know exactly what to think of the TG 74 episode. Obviously it could not have been intended to influence the course of the war in East Bengal. On the contrary, the Group was not formed until the outcome in East Bengal was perfectly clear."
Zumwalt is right about finding no one who knew of TG 74’s mission. Not even President Nixon knew it. Nixon in fact has given just one casual sentence to this entire episode in his memoirs, and says; "Later that afternoon (on 9 December) I authorized Admiral Moorer (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to dispatch a task force of 8 ships including the aircraft carrier Enterprise from Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal."4
The mission of the Task Group was a Zionist secret known only to Henry Kissinger and a handful of Zionist schemers from the CIA and the Israeli Mossad, who together were conducting the operations for dismemberment of United Pakistan. The Task Group was directly controlled (as also indicated by Zumwalt) from the White House, in other words by Kissinger, who was the National Security Advisor in the White House.
The Naval Task Force was used as a lethal instrument for a psychological purpose. It was to act as a flash signal of support to the dispirited leaders in Pakistan, who were facing a desperate situation in the war, so as to boost their morale with the hope that US military help had arrived after all; and then after a couple of days, to cancel the signal abruptly, causing in Pakistan’s military leaders a sudden and complete collapse of morale rendering them incapable of resistance to the offer of ceasefire with surrender.
This was exactly what happened. Disinformation about the mission of TG 74 was conveyed through various ‘reliable‘ sources to the top brass in Islamabad: General Yahya, General Hamid, Lieutenant General Gul Hassan – and through the latter to Lieut­ General Niazi in Dacca. Gul Hassan, then Chief of the General Staff, described the episode in an interview in 1984:
“A couple of days before the fall of’ Dacca, while we still had telephone contact with the East Wing, I passed a message to Niazi, which I had received from General Hamid who had apparently got it from General Yahya, that the United States and China are coming to help us.”5 
In his autobiography, published in 1993, he confirms it and says he passed the message to Niazi “on the evening of 12 December 1971.”6 In his own memoirs, Niazi refers to the message with bitterness, which is understandable.7  
The message immediately perked up the spirits of the generals, especially that of the beleaguered General Niazi. Just after the message had sunk in the minds of the recipients and their sagging spirits had lifted, the Americans flashed a new message to them: that the impression that any US help was on the way was misplaced and that the US Task Group had no such mission! This shattering piece of news acted as the last blow to the fragile will of Pakistan’s spineless military and civil leaders, whose nerves were already frayed by the enemy’s other tactics of psychological warfare; and they ceased to resist the pressure for surrender.   
The writer is an analyst of the global plot of world control.
1.      Sukhwant Singh, India’s Wars Since Independence, Vol 1, The Liberation of
      Bangladesh, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, p. 91.
2.   Ibid, p. 177.
3.   Elmo R. Zumwalt, On Watch: A Memoir, The New York Times Book Co, Inc,
      New York, 1976, p. 367.
4.      Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Crosset and Dunlap
      Publishers, New York, 1978, p. 525.
5.      Ahmad Munir, Almiya Mashriqi Pakistan: Panch Kirdar, (Urdu), Atish Fashan
      Publications, Lahore, 1984, p. 107.
6.      Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, Oxford University
      Press, Karachi, 1993, p. 328
7.      Lt. Gen. (R) A. A. K. Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Oxford University
      Press, Karachi, p. 186.